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ABSTRACT
In response to the recent Financial Crisis - after it had been widely accepted that “a serious 
disturbance in the economy of Member States” had occurred, and that several measures were 
required to remedy this disturbance, various Commission communications were adopted and 
these include: The Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation  to  financial  institutions  in  the  context  of  the current  global  financial  crisis  
(hereinafter  "the Banking Communication"),  its  Communication on the recapitalisation  of  
financial  institutions  in  the  current  financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum 
necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of  competition  (hereinafter  "the 
Recapitalisation Communication"), and its Communication on the return to viability and the  
assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the 
State  aid  rules  (hereinafter  "the  Restructuring  Communication").”  The  Banking 
Communication will constitute the focus of this study.
Are rescue aids (as distinguished from other forms of State aids) justified even where the 
possibility exists  that  rescue attempts  are unlikely to succeed? Should rescue aids still  be 
granted at a point when other measures such as winding down measures and the provision of 
other forms of liquidity assistance could be introduced?At what point should the Government 
decide upon the nationalisation of ailing institutions?
Furthermore, should State aids be provided to all classes of financial institutions which are 
considered to qualify for such aid – as stated within the Banking Communication?
These questions  interalia constitute  questions which are not only raised in this  paper, but 
which this paper aims to address through a consideration of different State aid rescue and 
restructuring measures, as well as reference to two rescue aid cases, namely those of Bradford 
& Bingley (State aid NN 41/2008 – United Kingdom Rescue Aid to Bradford & Bingley) and 
Hypo Real Estate (State aid NN 44/2008 – Germany Rescue Aid for Hypo Real Estate).
In addition,  the impact of the recent crisis on the choice of legislation and legal basis for 
compatibility assessments, will be highlighted. Whereas State aid to individual undertakings 
in difficulties is usually assessed under Article 87 (3)(c) of the EC Treaty and the Community 
Guidelines  on  State  aid  for  rescuing  and  restructuring  firms  in  difficulty,  the  systemic 
relevance  of  a  financial  institution  and the  impact  of  such  an  institution's  failure  on  the 
economy,  has been reflected by the preference for Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty and  Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU.
Key Words: Rescue Aids, Liquidity, Banking Communication, Systemically Relevant 
Financial Institutions, Guarantees, Recapitalisation, Financial Crisis.
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Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aid to Financial Institutions
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
In  response  to  the  recognition  that  “the  pervasive  uncertainty  about  the  credit  risk  of 
individual financial institutions” has severely restricted the market for inter bank lending – 
consequently impeding access to liquidity (for financial institutions), as well as the need to 
address a situation whereby the existence of individual financial institutions are threatened, 
the  ECOFIN  Council  adopted  measures  whose  purposes  are  directed  at  enhancing  the 
soundness and stability of the banking systems and consequently restoring confidence and the 
proper functioning of the financial sector.2
Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and the Community Guidelines on State Aid For Rescuing and 
Restructuring Firms in Difficulty3,  serve as the principal sources under which State aid to 
individual undertakings in difficulties is usually assessed.
An initial assessment occurs to establish whether the measures are to be regarded as State aid 
pursuant to Article 87(1) EC
What Constitutes a State Aid?
Legal bases
According to Article 87(1) EC, “State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or (ii) through 
State  resources  in  any  form  whatsoever  and  which  iii)  distorts  or  threatens  to  distort 
competition  by favouring  certain  undertakings  as  far  as  it  affects  trade  between Member 
States.”
Article 107(1) TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union): According to this 
provision, State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any 
form  whatsoever  which  distorts  or  threatens  to  distort  competition  by  favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods is, insofar as it affects trade between Member 
States.
The ensuing section of this paper will consider whether a distinction should be drawn between 
“the treatment  of  illiquid  but  otherwise fundamentally  sound financial  institutions”  where 
viability problems are exogenously induced and the treatment of financial institutions whose 
endogenous problems are attributed to inefficiency or excessive risk- taking. Section three 
will then introduce the different forms of State aids as set out under the  “Communication  
from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial  institutions  in  the  context  of  the  current  global  financial  crisis”4 –  hereinafter 
referred to as the Banking Communication. Such State aids include guarantees, rescue aids, 
1Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP) University of Bremen and Teaching Associate at 
Oxford Brookes University.
2 European  Commission,  “Communication  from  the  Commission  —  The  application  of  State  aid  rules  to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 
270/02), section 1 paragraphs 1- 3.
3 OJC 244, 1.10.2004 at page 2; the Community Guidelines which “articulate the Commission’s understanding 
of Article 87 (3) (c) of the Treaty”, are referred to as R and R guidelines; see ibid section 2 paragraph 6.
4(2008/C 270/02)
controlled winding up and other forms of liquidity assistance. The distortion of competition 
constitutes a major concern where State aids are provided - hence safeguards which are in 
place to ensure that competition is not distorted will be considered under section four. This 
will be facilitated through a reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of 
State aid rules of the EC Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereinafter referred to as TFEU). Section five will then provide the forum for discussion on 
new and existing recapitalisation schemes as provided under the present Communication from 
the  Commission  on  “the  recapitalisation  of  financial  institutions   in  the  current  financial 
crisis.”Emergency guarantees5 constitute the first identified systemic measure in response to 
the recent financial  crisis whilst the recapitalisation6 of financial  institutions constitute the 
second type of systemic measure. Other measures which may serve as supplements to rescue 
aids and which include the controlled winding up7 of financial institutions and the provision 
of  other  forms  of  liquidity  assistance,8 will  be  considered  under  sections  six  and  seven 
respectively. Having drawn on all these considerations, the final and concluding section will 
attempt to address the questions raised in this paper – as highlighted under the abstract.
B. Should Financial Institutions Whose Problems Are Attributed To “Inefficiencies, 
Poor Asset-Liability Management or Risky Strategies” Benefit From State Aid?
In its Communication9, the Commission draws a distinction between “the treatment of illiquid 
but  otherwise  fundamentally  sound  financial  institutions”  where  viability  problems  are 
exogenously induced and also related to extreme conditions which prevail  in the financial 
market, and the treatment of financial institutions whose endogenous problems are related to 
inefficiency or excessive risk- taking.
Even though adverse possible consequences of state rescues in both cases are acknowledged, 
namely,  the  potential  of  such aids  favouring  the  beneficiaries  –  to  the  detriment  of  their 
competitors, as well as the possibility that liquidity problems for financial institutions in other 
member states may be aggravated,10 the provision of assistance to those financial institutions 
5 Guarantees Covering the Liabilities of Financial Institutions granted either under a national scheme or on an ad 
hoc basis, with the requirements of Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU; see section 3 paragraph 17;ibid
6See section 4 paragraph 34;ibid. The recapitalisation of financial institutions is also considered comprehensively 
in the  Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial  institutions  in the current 
financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum  necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of 
competition  (2009/C 10/03)
7“Such a controlled liquidation, possibly carried out in conjunction with a contribution of public funds, may be 
applied in individual cases, either as a second step, after rescue aid to an individual financial institution when it 
becomes clear that the latter cannot be restructured successfully, or in one single action. Controlled winding-up 
may also constitute an element of a general guarantee scheme, e.g. where a Member State undertakes to initiate 
liquidation of the financial institutions for which the guarantee needs to be activated.”
See section 5; paragraph 43 of “Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 
270/02).
8 “Complementary forms of liquidity support - with the provision of public funds (including funds from the 
central  bank)”,  may be implemented by Member States as accompaniments to guarantees or recapitalisation 
schemes,  in  addressing  very serious  liquidity problems encountered  by financial  institutions.  See paragraph 
51;ibid.
9 See European Commission,  “Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 
270/02) – hereinafter referred to as the Banking Communication, section 2 paragraph 14
10 Furthermore,  the Commission adds that  distortions of competition resulting from schemes supporting the 
viability of institutions where viability problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme conditions 
which prevail in the financial market) will normally be more limited and require less substantial restructuring 
than the latter class of institutions; see ibid.
whose  problems  have  been  induced  as  a  result  of  inefficiencies,  poor  asset  liability 
management or risky strategies, could be disputed initially.
Provision of assistance to those institutions whose problems have been induced as a result of 
inefficiencies, poor asset liability management or risky strategies could however, be justified 
on the basis that such financial institutions are considered to be of significance in terms of the 
systemic risks which could be triggered within the financial system where such institutions 
are  allowed  to  fail.  That  is,  such  institutions  are  considered  to  be  “too  big  or  too 
interconnected  to  fail.”  Furthermore,  signals  should  be  sent  to  management  of  firms 
considered  to  be  “too big  to  fail”  that  their  importance  (in  terms  of  the threats  posed to 
systemic  stability  –  where  they  are  permitted  to  fail)  does  not  provide  an  excuse  for 
management  of  such  firms  to  act  recklessly  –  reckless  behaviour  being  attributed  to  the 
knowledge  that  in  any  case,  government  bail  outs  would  be  provided  in  the  event  of  a 
likelihood that financial failure may occur.
Restructuring of such institutions – to the extent that senior management (or indeed the entire 
management) of those institutions could be replaced would serve as a form of sanction and 
warning that reckless management of “too big to fail firms” would result in redundancies for 
the management of such firms.
C. Rescue Aids, Guarantees, Controlled Winding Down11 of Financial Institutions 
and Provision of Other Forms of Liquidity Assistance.
Emergency guarantees12 constitute  the first  identified systemic  measure in response to the 
recent  financial  crisis  whilst  the  recapitalisation13 of  financial  institutions  constitute  the 
second type of systemic measure. Other measures which may serve as supplements to rescue 
aids include the controlled winding up14 of financial institutions and the provision of other 
forms of liquidity assistance.15
Government guarantees, along with the monetary actions of central banks which are aimed at 
lowering interest rates as well as providing banks with exceptional amounts of liquidity, have 
served as means of addressing general liquidity needs of banks.16
11In this paper, Controlled Winding Up and Controlled Winding Down will be used interchangeably.
12 Guarantees Covering the Liabilities of Financial Institutions granted either under a national scheme or on an 
ad hoc basis, with the requirements of Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU; see section 3 paragraph 17;ibid
13See  section  4  paragraph  34;ibid.  The  recapitalisation  of  financial  institutions  is  also  considered 
comprehensively in the Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions  in 
the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions 
of competition  (2009/C 10/03)
14“Such a controlled liquidation, possibly carried out in conjunction with a contribution of public funds, may be 
applied in individual cases, either as a second step, after rescue aid to an individual financial institution when it 
becomes clear that the latter cannot be restructured successfully, or in one single action. Controlled winding-up 
may also constitute an element of a general guarantee scheme, e.g. where a Member State undertakes to initiate 
liquidation of the financial institutions for which the guarantee needs to be activated.”
See section 5; paragraph 43 of “Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 
270/02).
15 “Complementary forms of liquidity support - with the provision of public funds (including funds from the 
central  bank)”,  may be implemented by Member States as accompaniments to guarantees or recapitalisation 
schemes,  in  addressing  very serious  liquidity problems encountered  by financial  institutions.  See paragraph 
51;ibid.
16 See DG Competition Staff Working Document, „The Application of State Aid Rules to Government Guarantee 
Schemes Covering Bank Debt to be issued after 30 June 2010” April 2010 at page 2
In  the  rescue  case  involving  Hypo  Real  Estate  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  HRE),17 the 
Commission justified its decision to consider the guarantees as State aid since:18
i) It considered it evident that the guarantees were from State resources
ii) They had been offered to one bank only; and that
iii) Because  HRE  is  active  in  the  banking  sector  (which  is  characterised  by 
competition across member states), these measures distort competition and affect 
inter State trade.
D. Safeguards in Place To Ensure that Competition is not Distorted.
The Requirement that aid granted “does not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve 
its legitimate purpose and that distortions of competition are avoided or minimized as 
far as possible”
In line with the general principles which constitute the basis of State aid rules of the Treaty, 
which require that the aid granted “does not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve its 
legitimate purpose and that distortions of competition are avoided or minimized as far as 
possible, and taking due account of the current circumstances, all general support measures 
are require to be”:19
- well targeted in order to be able to achieve effectively the objective of remedying a 
serious disturbance in the economy;
- proportionate to the challenge faced, not going beyond what is required to attain this 
effect; and
- designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill over effects on competitors, other 
sectors and other member states.”
Compatibility of aid with the Internal market: The requirement of a Condition aimed at 
remedying “a serious disturbance in the economy of a member state.”(Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU).
The Requirement that aid serves “ to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State".
Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU allows the Commission to find aid compatible with the internal 
market if it serves “ to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State".20 
The Commission justified its assessment of State aid measures in the banking sectors at the 
time, in view of the current fragile state of the financial markets and with regards to the fact 
that the collapse and failure of a systemically relevant bank can directly affect the financial 
17See European Commission, „“State aid NN 44/2008 – Germany Rescue Aid for Hypo Real Estate” at page 2 
of 9 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-02.10.2008.pdf>
18 ibid; paragraph 19 at page 3
19 See section 3 paragraph 15 of the Banking Communication
20 European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency guarantees 
for Hypo Real Estate” at page 4 section 4.2.1 paragraph 21
markets and indirectly the entire economy of a Member State.21 Furthermore, the supervisory 
authority, BaFin, indicated that “a collapse of HRE group would have considerable negative 
effects on the national and international financial markets, with the potential to cause major 
disruptions and to eliminate the trust that has recently resurged.”22 The Commission, on these 
bases, assessed the State aid measures for HRE under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
Are Guarantees Appropriate, Necessary and Proportional?
In arriving at the conclusion that the guarantees were appropriate, necessary and proportional 
at the time, and in considering their compatibility with the Internal Market on the basis of 
Article  107(3)(b)TFEU  on  a  temporary  basis,  the  Commission  based  its  decision  on  the 
following considerations:23
i) That from the information provided by Germany, it was evident that HRE was still 
experiencing  serious  difficulties  in  covering  its  refinancing  needs  without 
continued State support, and therefore State guarantees on its funding operations 
are  an  appropriate  means  and  necessary  to  ensure  that  it  can  maintain  its 
operations.
ii)  In cases where financial stability is at stake and urgent remedial action is needed 
to keep the ailing bank afloat - as in the present case -, it can be accepted that it is 
necessary to temporarily grant emergency aid prior to the final assessment of the 
revised restructuring plan.
iii) The  guarantee  amounting  to  EUR 8 billion  is  proportionate  as  it  is  limited  in 
amount and time.
iv) The guarantee amounting to EUR 10 billion is proportionate as it is limited in time 
and amount.
Necessary procedures which had been promulgated by the German government in January 
2009, and which were aimed at facilitating the adoption of legislation which would enable it 
acquire  a  majority  stake  holding  in  Hypo,24 resulted  in  the  squeeze-out  of  minority 
shareholders - this being approved by a court in Munich in October 2009 (which paved way 
for  the  German  government's  rescue  fund  SoFFin  to  get  100  percent  of  the  real  estate 
lender).25
21 ibid
22 ibid at paragraph 22
23 see ibid at paragraphs 24-27
24 See Reuters, “Hypo Real Estate’s path to Nationalisation” 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5381WB20090409 >
25 See  Reuters,  “Hypo  Real  Estate  is  Nationalised  with  Squeeze  Out” 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD67573320091013>.  “The  Financial  Market  Stabilisation  Authority 
purchased 47.31 % of Hypo Real Estate shares. This was to ensure that at the General Meeting, which would 
take place on 2 June 2009, the Financial Market Stabilisation Authority would have the simple majority of votes 
and thus be able to put through a capital increase.  After the capital increase of EUR 3 billion, the Financial 
Market Stabilisation Authority was to subscribe to all new shares, which would give it 90 % of the voting rights. 
This  would  enable  it  to  take  over  all  shares  by  means  of  a  squeeze-out.  The  planned  acquisition  by  the 
Government was granted merger clearance by the Commission on 15 May 2009.”;see  Petrovic and R Tutsch, 
„National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial Crisis” ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 8/ 
July 2009 at page 41
E. RECAPITALISATION
Recapitalisation schemes in three26 member states and recapitalisation measures which accord 
with  principles  set  out  in  the  Banking  Communication,  have  been  approved  by  the 
Commission.27
Section 1 (4) of the Communication on the “Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in the 
Current Financial Crisis”sets out a number of objectives which the recapitalisation of banks 
could serve - within the context of the recent Financial Crisis:28
− First,  recapitalisations  contribute  to  the  restoration  of  financial  stability  and  help 
restore  the  confidence  needed  for  the  recovery  of  inter-bank  lending.  Moreover, 
additional capital provides a cushion in recessionary times to absorb losses and limits 
the risk of banks becoming insolvent.”29
− Second, recapitalisations can have as objective to ensure lending to the real economy. 
Fundamentally sound banks may prefer to restrict lending in order to avoid risk and 
maintain  higher  capital  ratios.  State  capital  injection  may  prevent  credit  supply 
restrictions  and  limit  the  pass-on  of  the  financial  markets'  difficulties  to  other 
businesses.30
− Third, State recapitalisation may also be an appropriate response to the problems of 
financial institutions facing insolvency as a result of their particular business model or 
investment strategy. 31
26See Commission Decision of 13 October 2008 in Case N 507/08 Financial Support Measures to the banking 
Industry in the UK (OJ C 290, 13.11.2008, p. 4), Commission Decision of 27 October 2008 in Case N 512/08 
Support measures for financial institutions in Germany (OJ C 293, 15.11.2008, p. 2) and Commission Decision 
of 19 November 2008 in Case N 560/08  Support measures for the credit institutions in Greece, Commission 
Decision  of  12  November  2008 in  Case  N 528/08  the  Netherlands,  Aid  to  ING Groep  N.V.,  Commission 
Decision of 25 November 2008 in Case NN 68/08 on Latvian State support to JSC Parex Banka.
27“Recapitalisation,  notably  in  the  form  of  ordinary  and  preferred  shares,  has  been  authorized,  subject  in 
particular  to  the introduction of  market-oriented  remuneration  rates,  appropriate  behavioural  safeguards  and 
regular  review.  However,  as  the  nature,  scope  and  conditions  of  recapitalisation  schemes  currently  being 
envisaged vary considerably,  both Member States and potential beneficiary institutions have called for more 
detailed guidance as to whether specific forms of recapitalisation would be acceptable under State aid rules. In 
particular, some Member States envisage the recapitalisation of banks, not primarily to rescue them but rather to 
ensure lending to the real economy. The ECOFIN Council of 2 December 2008 recognised the need for further 
guidance  for  precautionary  recapitalisations  to  sustain  credit,  and  called  for  its  urgent  adoption  by  the 
Commission. The present Communication provides guidance for new recapitalisation schemes and opens the 
possibility for adjustment of existing recapitalisation schemes.”  See Communication from the Commission — 
The recapitalisation of financial institutions  in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum 
necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (2009/C 10/03);section 1 para (3)
28See  Communication  from the Commission — The recapitalisation  of  financial  institutions   in  the current 
financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum  necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of 
competition  (2009/C 10/03)
29Furthermore, section 1 paragraph 4 states that “under current conditions, triggered in particular by the collapse 
of  Lehman Brothers,  fundamentally sound banks may require  capital  injections  to respond to  a  widespread 
perception that higher capital ratios are necessary in view of the past underestimation of risk and the increased 
cost of funding.”
30Ibid; Section 1 (5) 
31“A capital injection from public sources providing emergency support to an individual bank may also help to 
avoid short term systemic effects of its possible insolvency. In the longer term, recapitalisation could support 
efforts to prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its orderly winding-up.” see ibid; 
Whilst  recognising  the  benefits  of  recapitalisation,  its  potential  to  instigate  distortions  in 
respect of competition, is also acknowledged.32
F. CONTROLLED WINDING-UP OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Pursuant to Section 5, paragraph 43 of the Banking Communication, controlled liquidation 
(which is possible in collaboration with the contribution of public funds), may be undertaken:
- Either as a second step – after rescue aid to an individual financial institution has been 
granted (when it becomes clear that the latter cannot be restructured successfully) or;
- In one single action
“Controlled winding-up may also constitute an element of a general guarantee scheme.”33 The 
need to minimise moral hazard (through the exclusion of shareholders and particular classes 
of creditors from the receipt of benefit of any aid within the context of the controlled winding 
up procedure)  and the avoidance of undue distortions  of competition are  amongst  several 
considerations which are of vital importance.34
Liquidation Aid to Bradford and Bingley Plc
With  the  financial  turmoil  in  September  2008 and its  impact  on the  liquidity  position  of 
Bradford and Bingley, the UK authorities decided to pursue a wind-down procedure whereby 
the retail deposit book was to be sold while an orderly wind-down of the remainder of the 
business  was  to  be  undertaken  for  the  purposes  of  maximising  recoveries  –  as  well  as 
minimising the burden on taxpayers.35
A package of rescue measures which comprised of the following elements was accepted by 
the Commission : 36
a) the working capital facility; 
b) the guarantee arrangements to certain wholesale borrowings, derivative transactions 
and wholesale deposits existing as on 28 September 2008; and 
Section 1 (6)
32 See paragraphs 8-10
33 „ For instance, where a member state undertakes to initiate liquidation of the financial institutions for which 
the guarantee needs to be activated. The assessment for such a scheme and of individual liquidation measures 
taken under such a scheme are to be applied along the same lines, mutates mutandis, as set out for guarantee 
schemes.” See Section Five paragraph 43-44 of the Banking Communication.
34 Furthermore, i) “the liquidation phase should be limited to the period strictly necessary for orderly winding up; 
ii) The beneficiary financial institution should merely continue with ongoing activities and not pursue any new 
activities – as long as it continues to operate ; and iii) The banking licence should be withdrawn as quickly as 
possible.” See ibid paragraphs 46 and 47. 
35 See European Commission, “State aid N 194/2009 –United Kingdom: Liquidation Aid to Bradford and 
Bingley Plc at paragraph 4 page 2.
36 See Rescue Decision and ibid.
c) the public  support  resulting  from the Transfer  Order  containing  two aid elements: 
firstly, an aid to B&B through the payment of £612 million for the sale of the transfer 
package, and secondly, an aid to the transferred economic entity, which corresponds to 
the ability for this entity to remain in the market.
An orderly winding down process, it was submitted, would not only “maximise the value of 
the  remaining  assets  and  minimize  the  amount  of  necessary  state  aid”,  but  would  also 
facilitate  the  repayment  of  the  working  capital  facility  as  well  as  the  statutory  debt. 
Furthermore, the reasons for the choice of a controlled winding down process necessitated a 
consideration  of  the  legislation  in  force  when  the  decision  to  wind  down  Bradford  and 
Bingley (now Rumpco) was taken and such reasons include:37
- An absence of a “strictly defined time-frame” for large and complex liquidations such 
as that of Bradford and Bingley (B & B).
- The fact that B & B would not have obtained the working capital facility which was 
required  in  order  to  pay  Rumpco  creditors  –  had  B  &  B  chosen  the  route  of 
uncontrolled  insolvency.  An  uncontrolled  insolvency  procedure  would  also  have 
resulted in liquidation shortfall with respect to debt owed to such creditors.
- A uncontrolled  insolvency procedure  would  have  endangered  the  prospects  of  the 
recovery of full value of statutory debt.
- Rumpco’s  uncontrolled  insolvency would have undermined financial  stability  –  as 
well as market confidence.
G. PROVISION OF OTHER FORMS OF LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE
According to section 6 of the Banking Communication38 which deals with the provision of 
other  forms  of  liquidity  assistance,  member  states  are  permitted  to  implement 
“complementary forms of liquidity support – along with the provisions of public funds (which 
includes funds from the central bank)” in situations where “acute” liquidity problems are in 
need of redress. Furthermore, general measures which are implemented and are “open” to all 
market players on a comparable and equal basis (for example lending provided on an equal 
footing) and which do not constitute selective measures (which are in favour of individual 
banks), are often considered by the Commission as falling outside the boundaries of State 
rules and as such do not require notification to the Commission.39
37 See ibid at paragraphs 13 and 14
38See paragraph 51of the Banking Communication
39„The Commission considers for instance that activities of central banks related to monetary policy, such as 
open market operations and standing facilities, are not caught by the State aid rules. Dedicated support to a 
specific financial institution may also be found not to constitute aid in specific circumstances. The Commission 
considers that the provision of central banks' funds to the financial institution in such a case may be found not to 
constitute aid when a number of conditions are met, such as:
— the financial institution is solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision and the latter is not part of 
a larger aid package,
— the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in function of its quality and 
market value,
— the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary,
H. CONCLUSION
In response to the question on whether State aids should be provided to all classes of financial 
institutions  permitted  under  the  Banking  Communication  –  particularly  those  institutions 
whose  problems  have  been  induced  as  a  result  of  inefficiencies,  poor  asset  liability 
management or risky strategies, the grant of State aid to such institutions could be justified on 
the basis that such financial institutions are considered to be of significance in terms of the 
systemic risks which could be triggered within the financial system where such institutions 
are allowed to fail. Furthermore, the Government should be prepared at any point in time, to 
nationalise such systemically relevant financial institutions.
Are Rescue Aids(as distinguished from other forms of State Aids) Justified Even Where 
the Possibility Exists that the Rescue Attempts Are Unlikely To Succeed?
After having evaluated both cases relating to Hypo Real Estate and Rumpco, it was illustrated 
that both, respectively, were eventually nationalised and wound up. Nationalisation serves as 
an indicator that a government recognises the systemic importance of such institutions. The 
reasons  put  forward by both  authorities  in  justifying  the systemic  relevance  of  HRE and 
Bradford & Bingley (later known as Rumpco) include:
Consequences of Hypo Real Estate’s Insolvency
Three  consequences  emanating  in  the  event  of  HRE’s  insolvency,  as  identified  are  as 
follows:40
- Firstly, it would lead to very serious disturbances in the money markets in Germany 
and in the European Union.
- Secondly, there is a danger of serious distortions of payment transactions, for example 
in the case of transactions involving foreign exchange, securities or derivatives.
- Thirdly, it would damage the covered bond market, which plays an important role in 
refinancing the banks, particularly at this time of crisis. “41
In accordance with point 25 (b) of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, the aims of the 
measures provided to Rumpco are as follows: 42
— the measure is taken at the central bank's own initiative, and in particular is not backed by any 
counterguarantee of the State.”ibid
40 See See European Commission, „“State aid NN 44/2008 – Germany Rescue Aid for Hypo Real Estate” 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-02.10.2008.pdf>paragraph 18 
at page 5 of 9
41 “At around €900 billion, the German covered bond market is the second largest in the world. HRE represents 
around one fifth of this market. Covered bonds are a popular form of investment abroad, including in the USA, 
and confidence in them is high. Germany considers that the consequences of an uncontrolled collapse would be 
inestimable for the many creditors of HRE, with many banks being involved. Germany also states that pension 
schemes, professional associations, Bundesländer and municipalities had, in some cases, invested hundreds of 
millions in the Munich-based institute.”ibid
42See European Commission, “State aid NN 41/2008 – United Kingdom Rescue Aid to Bradford & Bingley” at 
paragraph 47 and page 9 of 11; 
“The Commission did not consider it necessary to assess whether Article 87(3)(b) EC, which allows aid 
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State would apply at that stage in time - given that 
- The  prevention  of  serious  social  difficultie.  Furthermore, such  measures  have  no 
unduly adverse spill-over effects on other Member States. 
- The protection of the jobs of some of the workers of B&B - who in the case of an 
ordinary liquidation may have lost their  jobs. The protection of depositors - hence 
preventing a situation whereby the savings of UK citizens could be endangered. 
- Maintaining confidence in the UK financial system – this being considered to be the 
most important of all the aims. 
As long as it has been established that the purpose of the State aid is directed at “remedying a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”, pursuant to  Article 87(3)(b) of the 
EC Treaty, considerations of other reasons put forward by state authorities for obtaining such 
state  aids,  as  well  as  whether  such  reasons  reflect  the  belief  that  these  institutions  can 
genuinely be rescued appear to be of less relevance. 
Reasons should clearly reflect the desire to facilitate measures aimed at preventing further 
deterioration of the stability of the economy. With respect to the economy, the impact of the 
recent crisis on the choice of legislation has also been demonstrated. Whereas State aid to 
individual undertakings in difficulties is usually assessed under Article 87 (3)(c) of the EC 
Treaty and the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in 
difficulty,  the  systemic  relevance  of  a  financial  institution  and  the  impact  of  such  an 
institution's failure on the economy, was reflected by the preference for Article 87(3)(b) EC 
Treaty and Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.43 - which were available as legal bases for aid measures 
undertaken to address the systemic crisis.
Should Rescue Aids Still be Granted at a Point When Other Measures Such as Winding 
Down Measures  and the Provision  of  Other Forms of  Liquidity  Assistance  could be 
Introduced?
As  mentioned  previously,  whether  the  reasons  advanced  by  authorities  for  State  aid 
application reflect  the belief  and possibility that these institutions can actually be rescued, 
appear to be of less relevance – as long as other stated criteria44 have been established. Where 
an  institution  is  of  such  systemic  relevance  as  to  merit  government  intervention,  and 
consequently  the  grant  of  State  aid,  then  such  an  institution  should  be  provided  with 
opportunities aimed at facilitating its rescue. Where and when it becomes certain and clear 
that  such  institutions  can  no  longer  be  rescued  or  restructured  successfully,  then 
supplementary assistance in the form of controlled winding down measures and other forms 
of liquidity assistance could then be introduced.
Furthermore, speedy processes whereby such systemically relevant institutions are wound up 
–  for  instance,  directly  instigating  uncontrolled  winding  up  procedures  without  due 
consideration  or  recourse to  rescue  possibilities  and/or  controlled  winding  up procedures, 
would  not  only  trigger  an  immediate  loss  of  jobs,  but  also  serious  disturbances  and 
repercussions which could further jeopardize the stability of the economy. 
the Commission considers that the measure is compatible on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC.” See ibid at 
paragraph 52
43 Under which the Commission may allow State aid ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State.’
44Such criteria including interalia the establishment that the purpose of the State aid is directed at “remedying a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”, pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.
However, it has to be highlighted that once government intervention has taken place, State aid 
beneficiaries  should not  be encouraged to  become too  dependent  on the Government  but 
rather,  should be stimulated to get back on their  feet  through “weaning” processes which 
would also reduce possibilities for distortions in competition.
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